Seven years ago - coincidentally, just the week before the attacks of September 11 - I happened to be on vacation in Istanbul. As I strolled the old cobblestone streets of this fascinating melange of cultural influences, I wondered what it must have been like living in this metropolis at the height of the Byzantine empire, just before the invasion of Mehmet the Conqueror's troops. I wondered what the inside perspective would have been in the capital of a realm that was past its peak, rendered ineffectual by internal corruption and by a myopic inability to interpret the clear signals foretelling its eventual demise. I wondered, again, how life in Istanbul was different several centuries later, as its new Turkish rulers faced a similar outlook and the Ottoman empire gradually deflated from its decadent peak.
As they say: be careful what you wish for!
Here we are now in 2008 watching the most recent chapter of the decline of the American empire. Just weeks ago,
Russia reminded us that US military hegemony has been relegated to paper tiger status; not so much by the rise of any other great power, but by its own pointless squandering of military resources in Iraq that has left the US unable to respond militarily in places that might actually matter. Today we see that America's economic prowess was built on a house of cards, fuelled by a speculative bubble, its obligations not supported by realistically valued tangible assets or adequate capital reserves.
Laissez-faire American economists' favorite argument against stricter regulation was to compare the wonderful American growth rates and low unemployment with the anemic growth rates and higher unemployment numbers in more regulated Europe and East Asia. But if one were to look at the American economy of the last twenty-five years (from the beginning of the Reaganite deregulation frenzy) to the present, and adjust the growth rates by deducting government military spending and the speculative dotcom and housing bubbles, American economic growth would not look much different from Europe's. Likewise, were one to count persons "out of the labor force" - as the convenient actuarial euphemism is termed - as unemployed in the US, the unemployment rate would also be similar to that of Europe.
I have no idea at this point what exactly the proposed $700 billion economic CPR kit will look like once Congress is done with it. I know what won't happen as a result of this crisis: even with the financial system teetering at the brink, the severity of the crisis is still not sufficient to change the prevailing American economic mentality of "perpetual growth". This is unfortunate, for this mentality is the root cause of the crisis.
In an advanced wealthy economy, economic growth is structurally limited by a factor of population growth and real terms productivity gains, plus any gains from technological innovation, plus increases in exports. This is different from a second-tier or third world economy that can realize double digit growth just by technologically and socio-economically catching up to the leading economies. In an advanced economy, such growth rates are simply not possible. The problem is that, as economies mature, markets tend toward equilibrium prices and accordingly toward very slim profit margins. At that point, traditional economic assets lose their attractiveness as investment vehicles. And this is where the Wall Street whiz kids get creative.
It is little understood in the West that Reaganism in fact put America on a straight path toward becoming the second loser of the Cold War. Reagan, in order to get the country out of the doldrums of the oil-crisis, embarked on the largest Keynesian government intervention in the market ever in the form of vastly increased military spending. All of this was financed by issuing government bonds to foreign buyers, while the focus on military industry neglected civilian innovation thus leading to an unprecedented trade deficit. At the same time, the Reagan administration started a gradual process of dismantling banking regulations - first and foremost the protections of the Glass-Steagall Act - which allowed investment banks to flourish. But this sudden availability of capital (which was in fact only borrowed), combined with abnormal growth rates in the military-industrial sector, lulled Wall Street into believing that high yields on investment could be maintained in perpetuity.
Reductions in military spending after the end of the Cold War and a drop in value of the US dollar during Bush I threatened to put a dent in this story of perpetual growth. But then came the deregulatory zeal of the "Republican Revolution" which further eroded Glass-Steagall and privatized large parts of our retirement and insurance system, thus turning retirement money and insurance premiums into investment capital for Wall Street bankers to gamble with. (You should know that
John McCain and his buddy Phil Gramm were vanguards of this crazy deregulatory front.) The result of this was to effectively co-opt all American workers into the Wall Street investment system, since nearly everybody's retirement now depends on the performance of Wall Street investment banks.
Essentially, what we ended up with in the 90s was too much investment capital chasing too few worthwhile assets. Too much capital invariably leads to two things: inflation and speculative bubbles. First we had the doctcom bubble. Primarily, this was fuelled by the total inability of most Wall Street types to actually understand the technology in question and value internet companies realistically. Large sums of money were invested in companies with flimsy products, or no products and no paying customers at all. Yet, while the going was good, a lot of people were making so much money in the internet business that their suddenly flush wallets sent real estate prices sky high in desirable locations like Silicon Valley and Silicon Alley. Fearful after 9/11 that the economy would not grow without stimulus, the Fed and other central banks around the world kept interest rates low or even lowered them further, thus in effect exacerbating the problem by making credit easier to come by and allowing Americans to spend even more recklessly on overinflated real estate. Due to this sudden inflation in home prices, real estate came to be seen as a profitable, seemingly low risk investment. In essence, the doctom bubble begat the real estate bubble.
Under normal circumstances, a healthy and powerful economy could deal with the losses resulting from such speculative bubbles. But what is so economically life-threatening about the present situation is that the deregulatory zeal of Republicans in the 80s and 90s created a landscape of undercapitalized but dangerously interdependent financial institutions holding a lot of paper based on assets and risk assessments conjured out of thin air. The problems that resulted from the packaging of good and bad loans in opaque securities with fictitious credit ratings have been explained elsewhere at length and I won't belabor them here, except to point out that the seemingly Byzantine structure of these financial products and the large number of parties involved is not at all unusual, but rather par for the course on Wall Street.
Of course, what we have seen so far in the way of reactions to the financial crisis on Wall Street is more likely to reinforce this interconnectedness in the future. Bank of America has bought Merril Lynch, JP Morgan is acquiring a large chunk of Washington Mutual and further mergers are certain to happen. At the end, we will have fewer players, less competition and more bad assets concentrated in larger houses of cards. If you thought AIG was too big to be allowed to fail, just wait until you see some of the behemoths that will come out of this reshuffling.
The sad thing is that all of this was preventable. The American paradox of the new millennium is that while America's leading universities continue to be highly influential global intellectual leaders, America is the last place where their ideas are being transformed into political action. From global warming to financial regulation, the best ideas often come out of Boston, New York or the Bay Area, but it's Brussels that acts on them first, not Washington. It was the Americans that initially pushed for tighter regulation of banks which resulted in the accord known as "Basel II", issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2004. This accord comprises three elements: increased requirements for capital reserves to more accurately reflect risks; greater transparency and disclosure requirements; and more effective regulatory and oversight tools for the agencies tasked with overseeing banks. The EU ratified Basel II in 2006 and it became the law in all member states on January 1, 2007. The US initially agreed to implement Basel II in gradual steps. But the free market zealots in the Bush administration succeeded in postponing implementation again and again, such that at present Basel II is unlikely to go into effect in the US in full before 2009.
Basel II is no magic bullet. But at the very least it could have compelled more realistic risk assessments of the liabilities resulting from various mortgage-backed securities, as well as from credit default swaps, and would have required the relevant institutions to keep larger cash reserves on hand to guard against failure. Had we passed Basel II in full sooner, we might still be in a hole today, but the hole would have been smaller and easier to get out of. Instead, the US is now resorting to buying out private debt with public debt. Whatever figure the administration and Congress agree on in the end, it will have to be financed by issuing more government debt in the form of government bonds. In other words, we yet again depend on the kindness of strangers to buy these bonds. How long they will be willing to do so depends to a large measure on how successfully we pull ourselves out of this slump and how well the next administration manages the budget, and accordingly how the dollar fares in the next few years. The next president will be in the unenviable position of facing utterly contradictory fiscal demands: keep the dollar low to increase exports and restart the economy or keep the dollar strong to be able to raise money from foreign governments?; invest in education, health care and infrastructure at home or cut government spending and get the budget and debt under control?; raise taxes to pay for the bailout or lower them in order to jumpstart consumer spending?
The failure of a timely implementation of Basel II, and the need to finance the buyout with foreign money, illustrate yet again that America pursues its unilateral exceptionalism at its own risk. Perhaps the silver lining on this gigantic storm cloud is that in light of the patently socialist market intervention about to be enacted by the Bush administration, the American public will in future be smart enough to see the right-wing laissez-faire propaganda for the sick joke that it is.